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Narration around “secret biolabs” in Ukraine as INFOOPS and PSYOPS internally (in Russia) and externally (in Poland)

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http://interdisciplinary-research.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/agro_terroryzm_robocza.pdf

http://interdisciplinary-research.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/agroterrorism_2022.pdf

mediatization of war



Agenda

- Introduction to infodemiology and infoveillance (the traditional and social-content media on the Internet in field of epidemiology and the role of infectious disease in digital media in Russia-Ukraine war)
- Why bio/agroterrorism and difference of representations in the media?
- Food as weapon (and its perception in media)
- Biolabs in Ukraine: Russian narration and BWC
- Remarks and lessons learned

Spring - Autumn 2022 in Europe?

- Intensification of actions against infrastructure and supply chain and **disinformation campaigns on food security** (probably less prioritize since summer due to good harvesting season in North America)
- Polarization of food producers against rest of population
- Fueling biological negationism (COVID-19, migrants health) in the Internet
- **Disinformation about NATO Biolabs (probably less prioritize due to failure of BWC meeting late summer)**





Introduction to infodemiology and infoveillance (the traditional and social-content media on the Internet in field of epidemiology)



Infodemiology

Infodemiology is concerned with the study of the demand (e.g. search engine queries) and supply (social media content creation or commenting) trajectory of information, which was strongly articulated during the COVID-19 pandemic.




Monitoring actual (real-time) and declarative attitudes should, in the WHO's view, be a priority for local decision-makers.



Infoveillance



Epidemiological surveillance deals with the analysis of web content to predict medical phenomena. Its most important advantage is the possibility of early warning (e.g. participatory reporting), or forecasting or improving estimators of incidence, prevalence or complications. Moving syndromic surveillance to the internet has great relevance (estimating the scale of health problems, early warning of events).

● Slovakia ● Poland ● Moldova ● Romania ● Hungary



History of Infodemiology and infosurveillance

- ▶ Google Flu Trends (2010) - syndromic infosurveillance using ILI keywords.
- ▶ Infosurveillance in prediction/forecasting COVID-19 infection dynamics worked far below expectation in Europe for publicly available dataset (i.e. Lamos, Vasileios, et al. "Tracking COVID-19 using online search." NPJ digital medicine 4.1 (2021): 1-11.), but seems to work with much more precise dataset in China (i.e. Guo, Shuhui, et al. "Improving Google flu trends for COVID-19 estimates using Weibo posts." Data Science and Management 3 (2021): 13-21.)
- ▶ High expectation, little predictive power (low digitalization rates and lack of availability of individual records in Western societies?)



Media listening as supporting tool for public health

- ▶ Measuring the social interest in/around SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 in the Internet media during the epidemic
- ▶ Quantifying dynamics of interest (demand and supply of content) and discourse patterns
- ▶ Internet as a digital footprint of social activities (secondary document analysis)
- ▶ Media Analysis of the social processes. SEO-marketing solutions as Brand24, SentiOne, SoTrender (used by Infodemic management by WHO)
- ▶ World Organisation for Animal Health and JRC use MedSYS, FAO uses PadiWeb mining engines
- ▶ Influence of foreign intelligence
- ▶ Serves as a complement to longitudinal surveys monitoring public perception (and other socio-economic methods) in REAL TIME

Tools


Using content in Polish with the help of monitors:

- Buzzsumo, **EventRegistry**, Medisys, Frazeeo (language corpus) – traditional media
- **Brand24**/SentiOne (**Facebook**, Instagram, Tiktok, Telegram, local media)
- **Twitter API**, EPITweetr-ECDC
- **Google trends**
- Youtube stats/comments
- Wikipedia stats

WHO Infodemiological intelligence

ECDC Infodemiological intelligence


Part of Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence in Berlin



<https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/collection/open-source-observatory-osor/news/searching-infectious-diseases-open-source>


<https://www.who.int/news/item/01-09-2021-who-germany-open-hub-for-pandemic-and-epidemic-intelligence-in-berlin>

<https://www.who-ears.com/#/>



Tools for Military infosurveillance (CBRNE)

- Google trends
- Social media monitor (mainly local Facebook and Telegram groups)
- Local forum monitor
- Local media monitor



Secret...



Tools for Military infodemiology

- **Google trends**
- **Social media monitor (mainly Twitter)**
- **Nationalwide media monitor**
- **i.e. AI tools for bots, trolls detections**


The food crisis, biolabs and COVID-19 in the media dimension can be analyzed in the INFOOPS (information operations) and PSYOPS (psychological operations) dimensions. From the perspective of infodemiology (as we have learned well during the pandemic), it is very important to detect influence of foreign intelligence in the discourse on infectious diseases through "bot army", "troll farm", influence agents, or ordinary useful idiots. Unfortunately, in information warfare we are dealing with a very well-prepared and experienced enemy who will use food and biological agents for propaganda purposes, because it allows for an easy effect on Polish society.

Biological negationism and Kremlin propaganda


(German language)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	id	text	is fake (yes/no/men/maybe/ NA)	FAKE 0-10	topics (soc/med /econ/pol/hum/NA)	sentiment (neu/pos/neg/NA)	Coder ID
2	1.30019E+1	Die friedlichen Fahnenschwenker auf der Reichstagstreppe regen unsere Politma	maybe	1	pol	neg	AJ

Is a Fake?




Is Conspiracy?




COVID-19/Monkeypox and Kremlin propaganda

(German language)



Automatic users classification Pro/anti COVID




Most frequently used words
(of those who dominate the conversation)

1. Affenpocken
2. dass
3. AMP (Association for Molecular Pathology)
4. Corona
5. Pocken
6. gehört
7. Lauterbach
8. schon
9. WHO
10. Impfung

[Driving factors of polarization on Twitter during protests against COVID-19 mitigation measures in Vienna](#)

COVID-19 and Kremlin propaganda (Germany)

There is qualitative evidence of intersection between anti-vaccination, anti-lockdown and pro-Kremlin narrative in European Social Media, but no research quantifies the level of the overlap before. Here I show that **pro-Kremlin users are over 51 times more likely to be involved in both anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine clusters** than anti-Kremlin users in German Twitter.




<https://doi.org/10.2196/preprints.39743>

COVID-19 and anti-Ukrainian propaganda (Poland)

Keyword	Counter
covid	2809
szczepień	2094
ukraina	1298
szczepionka	935
uchodźcy	255
naziści	212
banderowcy	90
bandery	49

Polish-language Telegram channels are spreading anti-refugee, pro-Kremlin, and at times, anti-vaccine content.


Refugees and HIV (Poland)



With the current share of migrants (~10% of population) and probable following during winter season 2022/2023 the risk of spreading tuberculosis, HIV, measles and the COVID-19 are among the medical concerns.

#StopUkrainizacjiPolski + HIV Infectious diseases as HIV gain interest in the social and traditional media in context of refugees (stigma)

Is long-covid biological or social PROBLEM




Virchow

VS

Koch



Why bio/agroterrorism and difference of representations in the media? Food as weapon (and its perception in media)



Agroterrorism is not only a biological attack on animal breeding and plant cultivation (this dimension is included in the broadly understood bioterrorism), but it can also be an attack on transport, infrastructure, means of production and work motivation (it is another criminal or terrorist activity). In the modern era, agroterrorism can be used by various actors, so due to the possibility of acting, the following can be distinguished:

- Senu stricte: activities of terrorist organizations;
- Senu lato: Hybrid actions below the threshold of the BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) and the Geneva Protocols (for the protection of victims of armed conflict) by states (e.g. attacks on supply chains or the polarization of food producers) or by making it difficult for aggressors to prove an act of terrorism.

New Lone Wolves repertoire and a new needs

Agroterrorism



Standard human bioterrorism



The perception of infectious diseases differs dependent on host type:

- human hosts (the highest interest among the general population);
- zoonotic agents (average interest with some peaks during local events as SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks among Minks, Rabbits or possible spillovers);
- Animal/plant host only (interest only in engaged agents).

Agroterrorism



?

No risk to a potential terrorist to own health



Lack of psycho-sociological effects of intentional introduction





Agroterrorism



- zoonotic agents ->human medicine
- **Animal production** OIE used to classify up to 2018 livestock pathogens as:
 - A. Highest risk (the severity of the illnesses they produce and their ease of dissemination, and their high level of transmissibility): with ASFV but also FMD (Foot and Mouth Disease), CSF, Classical Swine Fever (CSF), avian influenza, etc.
 - B. Medium risk (moderately easy to disseminate and cause moderate diseases with low fatality rates), e. g. brucellosis, salmonella, non-living toxins (ricin and enterotoxin B).Attack on transportation, infrastructure, means of production, and motivation to work
- plant productions pathogens e.g. *Xylella fastidiosa* (bacterial host olive trees), *Candidatus Liberibacter solanacearum* (bacterial Zebra chip disease of potato), ***Colletotrichum fructicola*** (fungi fruit disease), *Bactrocera dorsalis* (oriental fruit fly)

Poland



Summary interest across selected terms (disease) and medium

term(topic)/summary interest	weekly RSV Google Search (01.2020-07.2022)	daily No. article (01.2020-07.2022)
COVID-19	713	330390
Coronavirus	1368	255620
HPAI	2.2	29857
ASF	3.3	17893

Totally different perception: almost 1000 fold higher interest in human than animal diseases (No. search weekly)

Slightly different perception almost few/dozens fold higher interest in human than animal diseases (No. articles daily)

<https://www.vetmed.fu-berlin.de/en/einrichtungen/institute/we10/ISAH-2022/downloads/Abstract-Book-ISAH2022.pdf>

High presence of ASF and HPAI in digital traditional media suggests that awareness campaigns have been performed (Agenda setting), however its effectiveness can be questionable due to low reach in a general population.

About 40% of Poles have no opinion on the use of antibiotics in animal husbandry, where the EU average is 20%

Lack of knowledge about infectious animal diseases among urban residents in Poland

Paradox of Poland. 15% share of employment in agriculture and very little attention on Food security threats

Impact of Food/Hunger Crises in Polish Population

Phrases related to hunger and the food crisis, content monitoring was applied during 02/24 - 01/08/2022.

Using Buzzsumo, Brand24, Twitter API or Google trends, 958 articles and multimedia in traditional digital media with the greatest reach and 59,453 Tweets were analyzed.

Only 33% of the mentions were negative, which may result from many threads of the discussion, such as the positive overtone of the support of Polish farmers towards Dutch farmers in the summer of 2022 (effect of feeling of being united).

In the case of hunger, there is a fairly even distribution of interest. Interestingly, the traditional media noted a slightly increased interest between April 24-23, 2022 (e.g. discussions about the export of food products from Ukraine), the most searches on Google took place between February 24-14, 2022 (fear related to the beginning of the war), above average interest on internet portals May 23-24.06.2022 (discussion on Ukrainian grain and the role of Poland in transport) and increased activity on Twitter between 04-14.07.2022 (large contribution of agricultural protests in the Netherlands and negotiations on access to Ukrainian grain in Poland or via unblocking the ports in Odessa), which proves the different dynamics of interest in various media targets.

It is worth emphasizing that the widespread fear of the food crisis and the high price of food products in Poland had already expired in April 2022. Therefore, it seems that the Kremlin propaganda in the first phase of the conflict fueled the fear of high food prices, and then shifted the emphasis to the potential threat to Polish agriculture. by cheap food from Ukraine. In the case of July's peak in interest in social media, these are largely issues related to the appearance of Ukrainian grain in Poland and solidarity protests with Dutch farmers against EU programs such as "Green Deal" or "From farm to fork", e.g. through accounts related to by the Agrounia organization.

Interference of foreign intelligence on social media as an act of agroterrorism?

Let apply scales used in agroterrorism with biological pathogens for propagation of information (per analogia).

Here information can be viral and its seeding or helping to spread may be by deliberative inference.

GO VIRAL!


Criteria	Assessment Points	Weighting Factor
Biorisk	0,1,2,3	3
Unusual strain	0,1,2,3	3
Geographic distribution	0,1,2,3	1
Environmental concentration	0,1,2,3	3
Epidemic intensity	0,1,2,3	1
Transmission mode	0,1,2,3	1
Time	0,1,2,3	1
Unusually rapid spread	0,1,2,3	1
Population limitation	0,1,2,3	2
Clinical	0,1,2,3	1
Special insight	0,1,2,3	3

Sequeira R., Safeguarding production agriculture and natural ecosystems against biological terrorism: A U.S. department of agriculture emergency response framework, [in:] Food and Agricultural Security: guarding against natural threats and terrorist attacks affecting health, national food supplies, and agricultural economics, Ed. T. W. Frazier, New York 1999


use of non-traditional pathways	0,0.5,1
increase of the probability of survival of the pest in-transit	0,0.5,1
widespread dissemination of the disease from disparate foci	0,0.5,1
use of highly virulent strains,	0,0.5,1
high rates of inoculum	0,0.5,1
introduction into remote areas	0,0.5,1
targeting of susceptible production areas	0,0.5,1
targeting of susceptible natural environments	0,0.5,1
release of multiple species simultaneously	0,0.5,1
precise timing of releases to coincide with maximal colonization potential	0,0.5,1

Agricultural index

Farmers protests in NL (June/July 2022)



- Pre-existing social conflicting matters of animal production. Such a structural configuration facilitates mobilisation of own groups of interest and ends up with conflict between animal breeders, far-right, agricultural parties, Christian organisations as well as opposing, government opposition and ecological organisations and far-left. COVID-19 crisis and pressures on farmers related to economic and climate challenges cause more and more farmers to escape from animal production. Moreover, special operation in Ukraine during 2022 threatens supplies for fertilizers and some crops, causing increases in animal feed prices as well as high energy prices (high level of energy consumption in animal products)
- changing and ending livestock production as well as deanimalization processes speed up. The European Green Deal is projected to affect livestock production by decline between 5% and 15%, with the animal breeders income being the hardest hit among all farmers in the perspective of the next 10 years



The potential interaction between agents wider definition in the context of food production (farmers, ecologists, hunters, vets, public administration) with red – conflicting and blue – cooperative.

Polarization

AFFECTIVE

- Emotional load (sentiment)
- Affective differentials (i.e. negative electorate)
- Coleman's index of segregation (i.e. comparing levels of anti-COVID measures support in various communities)
- Narratives (topic analysis)

BEHAVIORAL

- Collaboration/Conflicts among partisan lines (intercommunity links)
- Movement between communities (i.e. Alluvial graph or Dissimilarity Index a Gini coefficient of descriptive variable)

Criteria	Farmer Protests Summer 2022, NI	
Biorisk	2	6
Unusual strain	1	3
Geographic distribution	1	1
Environmental concentration	3	9
Epidemic intensity	1	1
Transmission mode	1	1
Time	0	0
Unusually rapid spread	2	2
Population limitation	2	4
Clinical	1	1
Special insight	2	6
	Sum mod G-T scale	34
use of non-traditional pathways	1	
increase of the probability of survival of the pest in-transit	0,5	
widespread dissemination of the disease from disparate foci	0,5	
use of highly virulent strains,	1	
high rates of inoculum	0,5	
introduction into remote areas	0,5	
targeting of susceptible production areas	0,5	
targeting of susceptible natural environments	0	
release of multiple species simultaneously	0,5	
precise timing of releases to coincide with maximal colonization potential	0	
Agro index	5	

Such a high scores for GT and Agri index suggest presence of foreign intelligence in fuelling up viral processes in social media during farmers protests...

As Anti-COVID protests in Germany 2020

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66046-8_43



<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/germany-ground-zero-covid-infodemic-russia-far-right/>


Biological weapons have a huge potential for socio-political influence, as the Russians recently showed when the topic of alleged secret American laboratories...



Narration around “secret biolabs” in Ukraine as INFOOPS and PSYOPS internally (in Russia) and externally (in Poland)

Unofficial narration and propaganda:

- Multiple multimedia materials from war zones
- Mainly internal role, but also to influence fear in other countries (i.e. Poland)



Official narration:

- Mainly internal role, but also to rise some concerns in the public (Ukraine, USA, Germany, Poland, etc.) and allies
- There were an enormous amount of biological errors disqualifying any kind of scientific discussions



Main Questions:

- Ukraine failed to ensure an adequate level of biological protection in organizations and institutions that work with particularly dangerous pathogens?
- How was the US assistance, as implemented, supposed to ensure the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population of Ukraine?
- Why veterinary not human diseases were object of US-Ukraine collaboration?

Arguments:

International projects dissemination and legal documents. Internal reports of stockpiling and on security

After war documents:


“unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with containers and equipment which can be used to spray bioagents in Kakhovka and Cherson”

Lack of arguments:

- From Sanitary-Epidemiological station in Mariupol
- Order to destroy germs
- Other documents missing why?

BWC meeting documents:

- multiple arguments, but main focus on only 4 main groups of documents
 - Concentration on US and Ukraine only
- More rigorous, but still shown as a discreditation of the Russian Federation



„American” Biolabs

The concept is not new. In 2007 USA was accused in Russian media for introducing ASF to Russia via Georgia.



Narration around “secret biolabs” in Ukraine as INFOOPS and PSYOPS internally (in Russia) and externally (in Poland)

- Biological weapons have a huge potential for media coverage and disinformation campaigns, as the Russian Ministry of Defence recently showed when the topic of alleged secret **US/German/Polish** sponsored laboratories in Ukraine began a series of public slots by the with a series of presentations in 2022 (10.03, 17.03, 14.04, 27.05, 17.06, 07.07, 04.08, 03.09-during BWC, 19.09)
- Formal Consultative Meeting of Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) **took place 5-9.09.2022** regarding outstanding questions by the Russian Federation about operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine.
- It should be emphasized that in each of these presentations there is a constant threat of infectious diseases of animals, mainly concerning ASF and avian influenza. The commander of the radiological, chemical and biological defense forces of Russia Igor Kirillov repeatedly emphasizes that the Russians "obtained" evidence of biological experiments on humans, but also on pigs, wild boar and birds, or with insects. Additionally, at the session of the UN Security Council on March 11, 2022, the arguments between the US and Russia were confronted

Briefing by the Chief of nuclear, biologic and chemical protection troops of Russian Armed Forces Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov

Biolabs in Ukraine

Mainly zoonotic disease, but also accuse of using XDR TB against Dombas states, or use of Cholera

Военно-биологическая деятельность Германии и Польши

4

Программа биологической безопасности Германии

Wir fördern Biosicherheit für eine sichere Welt:
Das Deutsche Biosicherheitsprogramm

Veranstaltung
Datum, Ort, Land

Name, Funktion,
Institution

1. Spektrum biologischer Risiken

Закдействованы 12 стран:
Украина, Казахстан, Грузия, Пакистан,
Судан, Египет, Тунис, Марокко, Камерун,
Мавритания, Сьерра-Леоне, Косово

3. Globales Engagement

Überblick: 12 Projekte, 12 Partnerländer

5. Programmaufbau

6. Programmziele

Информация о военном биологическом потенциале Германии и Польши

Проект «Описательный пространственно-временной анализ случаев бешенства среди домашних и диких животных на Украине в 2012-2018 годах»

«...В рамках проекта отобрано около 3500 образцов сывороток здоровых лиц, которые проживают на территории 25 областей, их тестирование продолжается и сегодня.»

Проект «Описательный пространственно-временной анализ случаев бешенства среди домашних и диких животных на Украине в 2012-2018 годах»

Институт ветеринарной медицины Варшавского университета естественных наук

BATTELLE
Battelle Memorial Institute

Львовский медицинский университет

Львовский медицинский университет им. Данила Галицкого

Платежное уведомление Львовского медицинского университета о переводе в Варшавский медицинский университет в состав которого наладится Львовский НИИ эпидемиологии и гигиены, участник военно-биологических проектов США) 43 040,41 евро

giz Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH

ROBERT KOCH INSTITUT

Institut für Mikrobiologie der Bundeswehr

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
Narration around “secret biolabs” in Ukraine as INFOOPS and PSYOPS internally (in Russia)

Content analysis of produced media releases in context of their biological integrity and agenda setting (in context of Poland).

In internal Russian narrative theme of the development of biological weapons by Poland has long been present in the media form pseudo-scientific studies, there are:

- historical anecdotes from the Polish-Moscow wars,
- **accumulation of charges is based on the "mythical" Polish biological program in the interwar period, developed during and after the Polish-Bolshevik war,**
- the activity of the Polish Underground State.

Narration around “secret biolabs” in Ukraine as PSYOOPS externally (in Poland)



Impact analysis: We attempt to measure the influence of Russian allegations using Buzzsumo, Brand24, Twitter API, or Google trends content monitors, related to the variations of the keyword biolab / biological weapon on Polish infosphere between 24.02-01.08.2022 in order to measure effectiveness of external Russian propaganda (mainly through Polish-language propaganda channels or channels resonating with Russian propaganda) on causing anxiety and fear in Polish society. The peak of activity in Polish traditional and social-content media took place between March 9-24, 2022 (which is only 9% of the entire time period), when as many as 72% of Google queries, 49% of articles and multimedia on internet portals and 43% of Tweets has been posted with multi-million reach. It suggests that the Kremlin's influence on Polish society was effective in the sense that it sparked a wave of interest.

Narration around “secret biolabs” in Ukraine as INFOOPS externally (in Poland)

“American laboratories” may influence (according to narration) the alleged biological catastrophe and become the cause of World War III. The above-mentioned narrative is also an element of blaming the US for Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

The ridiculous concept of developing biological weapons that would be spread by specially trained migratory birds targeting ethnic Slavs such as Russians (its against genetic knowledge, because Russian population has less so-called „Slavic genes” than other populations i.e. Polish).

It is worth emphasizing that the Russians certainly notice how much Polish society is susceptible to conspiracy theories in area of animal disease (low health/veterinary literacy among population living in the cities).

Wydarzenia

13:17 Zacharowa: nacjonalisci strzelają do Ukraińców, którzy chcą się ewakuować w kierunku Rosji

12:45 Tajemne amerykańskie laboratoria od wielu lat zabijały Ukraińców

08:58 Śiew odjedzie się zgodnie z harmonogramem. Rosja przerywa pokojowe życie

20:09 Ukraińskie władze rozpoczęły terror na dużą skalę: bojownicy aresztują politoligów

19:47 Rozbiór czy druga Finlandia – geopolityczna przyszłość Ukrainy

18:56 KE wyznawca Europejczyków do walki z Rosją pogrzeb obniżenie temperatury w mieszkaniach

14:16 ONZ: na Ukrainie torturują ludzi sympatyzujących z Rosją

Tajemne amerykańskie laboratoria od wielu lat zabijały Ukraińców

09.03.2022 12:45

Share    




Obywatele Ukrainy od wielu lat sprzeciwiali się stworzeniu w kraju amerykańskich laboratoriów wojskowo-biologicznych, powołując ich pojawienie się z licznymi zgonami swoich rodaków z powodu nieznanymi chorob. O tym świadczą petycje rozmieszczone na oficjalnej stronie internetowej ukraińskiego rządu.

Narration around “secret biolabs” in Ukraine as INFOOPS externally (in Poland)

The Russians biolab conspiracy theory has an effect causing panic in Poland and anti-Ukrainian and anti-American sentiments (main impact on March 2022)

The Russian side was trying to introduce a narrative to the Polish infosphere about the existence of secret American laboratories, which allegedly not only caused the deaths of many of Ukrainians (i.e. soldiers under experiments or people living in Dombas), but were also one of the reasons for the of the invasion.

According to the Russian vision of reality, these animal disease and zoonosis laboratories are currently located, among others, in in the territory of the Republic of Poland (have been transferred). The distribution of such messages serves to stimulate anti-American sentiments in Poland, which is part of the efforts to disintegrate NATO.





РИА Новости
1.9M subskrybentów



Признаки занятия чёрной магией обнаружены в штабе украинских минометчиков на окраине села Трехизбенка в ЛНР: они пытались "освятить" оружие и делали пометки кровью.

Культуролог Екатерина Дайс объяснила РИА Новости, что этот символ **"является магической печатью темных сил, сочетающим в себе идеи анархии, оружия и фашистской символики"**.

В самом штабе нашли релиз украинских силовиков с рассказом о потерях на Донбассе. На нем есть полосы от крови, притом что в других местах подобных следов нет.

415

„Black magic”

CBRNE(M)

Legal acts

Biological Weapons Convention (1972)

Art 1. “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes”

Biological Weapons Convention States Parties were **notified** on 08.07.2022 that Russia has triggered Article V and called for a **formal consultative meeting** (this is the second time in history after the case of Cuba vs. USA in 1997).

Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts - Protocol I (art. 54), II (art. 14) (1977).

”Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works”

Main Questions:

- Ukraine failed to ensure an adequate level of biological protection in organizations and institutions that work with particularly dangerous pathogens?
- How was the US assistance, as implemented, supposed to ensure the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population of Ukraine?
- Why veterinary not human diseases were object of US-Ukraine collaboration?

Arguments:

International projects dissemination and legal documents. Internal reports of stockpiling and on security

After war documents:


“unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with containers and equipment which can be used to spray bioagents in Kakhovka and Cherson”

Lack of arguments:

- From Sanitary-Epidemiological station in Mariupol
- Order to destroy germs
- Other documents missing why?

- Biolab narration is purely a product of propaganda offices or PR agencies without any kind of attention to biological integrity (which sounds very strange as Russian microbiology and epidemiology scientific level is very high).
- Therefore, Biolabs can be treated purely the INFOOPS (information operations) and PSYOPS (psychological operations) dimensions.
- Low level preparedness by Russian delegates is surprising, errors in documents, almost no evidence after 24.02 neither from intelligence or captured areas
- **Why "decree of the Ministry of Healthcare of Ukraine (February 24, 2022) for emergency destruction of pathogen collections has reinforced our concerns about possible violation of the articles I and IV within the BTWC requirements" was not include in BWC argumentation, but was used for official narration?**
- Passive orientation of Russia allies as China (targeting only US biological program in general)
- Ninth Review Conference will be used to continue allegation towards US
- After BWC meeting no more new biological official allegation were stated, and no massive propaganda operation with biology as threat was observed (since September Nuclear threat was „turn on“)

Briefing by the Chief of **nuclear**, biologic and chemical protection troops of Russian Armed Forces Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov since September 2022 are about:



What about Autumn/WINTER 2022 in EU (and what media analysis have to do with it)

- Jumps of plant/animal pathogens on disease free areas (surveillance of local media and forums/groups on Facebook)
- Local outbreaks of human diseases (surveillance of Google trends, local media and social media)
- Animal breeders protests and animal right defenders counter protests (analysis of Twitter and other social media)
- Coronascepticism engagement in the Internet (analysis of Telegram and TikTok)



ID	Aggregated Tweets
1	In anderen Ländern würden sie euch und eure GRUNDRECHTE niederknüppeln dann 23 Tage einsperren und Windelweich prügeln bevor ihr wieder zu Mami und Papi dürft verdammt es sterben jeden Tag Menschen w2011 Demo Impfpflicht Deutschland oestereich lockdown ungeimpft
2	Ich habe Bilder im Kopf lustiger kann es heute nichtmehr werden w2011
...	...
8,513	Heldenplatz in Wien vor dem Bundeskanzleramt und dem Amtssitz des Bundespräsidenten w2011 Wien2011 Österreich Impfpflicht Lockdown Faschismus



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- The threat of agroterrorism is currently greatest since the signing of the BWC due to the food crisis and the war in Ukraine (with possible huge role of media to escalate the effect or hidden the source);
- Poland, the Nordic countries, the Baltic states and Great Britain seem to be the most exposed to the Kremlin's physical actions, but Germany or France through ISIS (thus other introduction scenarios may come into play);
- It is worth carrying out exercises and simulations based on probable introduction scenarios (e.g. introduction of ASF in the Netherlands, FMD in Wielkopolska, or apple pests in the Lublin region) together with PR agencies and journalists;
- **A system of traditional and social media listening should be developed in order to detect in real-time the potential impact of Kremlin propaganda and actors resonating with it;**
- A system for monitoring the risk of radicalization (i.e. in social media) in veterinary and agricultural professions and in the new category of post-pandemic professionals should be developed;
- **The use of calibrated tools for the epidemiological assessment of Grunow & Finke or the Agricultural Index should be popularized, which should be applied agricultural events (i.e. in the social media) that took place in Europe after the Russian invasion on Ukraine.**

